Tyranny of the Relativists

There’s a great riff in John McWhorter’s book, The Power of Babel: A Natural History of
Language
, that describes how expressive force in language diminishes over
time.  His poster child is the word
“terrible” which once meant “causing dread or fear or terror,” but now is used
as a mild negative modifier (e.g.,
“I’m such a terrible putter that my wife got me personalized golf balls that
say, ‘three putt.’ ”) 

Similarly, the language of business is littered with
expressions that slouched from overuse: phrases like “best of breed” went from
insightful to hackneyed over the course of mere years.
Of course, private equity has its very own once-powerful phrase that’s
meandered to meaninglessness: Top Quartile. 
Now we all know how Top Quartile got to be the gold standard: a couple
of cool graphs in the Book of David some McKinsey studies, an
endorsement by an influential pension fund or two and Top Quartile was the
place to be. 

Everyone wanted to be in the Top Quartile, and, soon enough,
most people were – if you accepted their pro forma returns based on aggressive
multiples of EBBS (earnings before, ahem, bad stuff) or included estimates of
what an acquirer might pay for a start-up once it had perfected its swell
product and revenues had started their inevitable ramp.

The problem with that kind of thinking is that it obscured
the true aim of private equity: return enhancement (relative to the opportunity
cost of equity capital, i.e., some
appropriate public benchmark).  Success
was no longer about getting adequately compensated for taking incremental
risks; it was now about beating the next guy (or more specifically, the next
three guys).  

And that’s the paradox, of course, of any peer-group
measure: when new entrants deploy capital, their extra dollars will likely
depress returns across the spectrum – since the marginal dollar tends to set
the price of assets – but the cohort of “winners” (with victory defined as
being Top Quartile) grows.  The club gets
less elite as people enter from the bottom.

Of course, measuring private performance against a public
benchmark can be pretty tricky and is fraught with tough questions like: what’s
the appropriate evaluation horizon, how do you equalize for appraisal effects,
should you beta-adjust? to name a few. 
As a result, it’s tempting to fall back on an easy measure like peer
group rank.

A while back, I started asking VCs what they thought the top
quartile breakpoint for venture over coming vintage years might be assuming
reasonably “normal” public market conditions. 
In my informal and unscientific survey, more than half of those I asked
guessed that the top quartile line would be at or below zero.  Surely, some firms will do fantastically
well, but if the VCs I sampled are right, it will be really amazing that dozens
and dozens and dozens of firms that tinker in one of the riskiest corners of
the financial world will be able to call themselves successful even though they
will have lagged the public market – not to mention cash – by many hundreds of
basis points.  What’s more amazing is
that merely by surviving, these firms will earn billions of dollars in fees in
aggregate and the folks who funded them will dance a jig for having done a
great job.

It’s enough to remind one of an old story: two campers are
awakened by the sounds of a bear sniffing at their tent.  While one of the campers starts panicking,
the other calmly starts putting on his sneakers.  “Why are you putting on your shoes?  There’s no way you can outrun that bear,”
whispers the first camper.  “I don’t need
to outrun the bear,” replies the second camper, “I just need to outrun you.”

That kind of thinking may work for relativists, but the
important return-enhancing role that PE plays in institutional portfolios
demands that we instead ask: for all the extra risk and illiquidity we incur,
if you can’t outrun the bears (and the bulls) why bother?

One Strike Away . . .

I’ve been in a bunch
of meetings over the past few months with buyout guys who say things like, “we’re
in the seventh inning of the credit crunch.” 
In fact, it seems like every time I turn on CNBC or read the Bloomberg,
the inning metaphor is up at the plate. 

The use of innings
as a proxy for time seems like a swing and a miss to me, though.  Since baseball is alone among major sports in
allowing the defense to control the ball, the sport is liberated from the
tyranny of time marching inexorably forward. 
I like football and basketball as much as the next guy, but the practice
of running out the clock by taking a knee or dribbling around the floor has
always seemed vaguely anticlimactic to me. 

You just gotta get
that third out in the ninth inning and it could take all day to get it done.  As a young pitcher, I once allowed six consecutive
hits (!) with two outs in the last inning. 
In fifteen minutes, a fine pitching performance was undone and I went
from complete-game winner to hard-luck loser.  All for want of just one more out . . .

A late inning grand
slam can turn a blowout into a tight game and completely reverse a game’s momentum;
anything can happen and the clock won’t bail you out.  And that’s what makes the metaphor funky: it
almost doesn’t matter what inning of the game you’re in, something totally discontinuous
can occur at any moment.   

Maybe that actually makes
the metaphor brilliant?  Perhaps embedded
in the sense of progress toward the conclusion, there might be an implicit acknowledgement
that the credit crunch is not unlike a baseball game.  And we know what they say
about ballgames: it ain’t over until it’s over. 

Tragic Kingdom

When it comes to real twistedness – I mean deeds that are
way out in the tails of the normal distribution of human behavior – the
old-school Greek tragedies are heard to beat. 
Loathsome cunning and guile? 
Check.  Outlandish interpersonal
relationships?  Check.  Unbridled greed and lust for power?  Check.

Of course, the tragedies were morality plays that showed the
audiences of Epidaurus
what vices arose when virtues were taken to their extreme.  Remember that the Tragic Hero was a hero
first and tragic second.  And what made
these stories so compelling and spectacular and gut-wrenching was just this
journey from mortal to casualty of the gods.

A wise man once said that there were only a few dozen
archetypes in all fact and fiction. 
Lately, I’ve been wondering if some private equity pros might not fit
the Tragic Hero archetype.  Now don’t get
me wrong, there are a ton of virtuous and honorable people in private
equity.  I invest in people that are – to
a man (and woman) – decent and upright. 
That said, I sometimes think there are a handful of PE investors out
there that have fallen victim to the ancient unraveling . . . 

The cycle goes like this: first you have arete, which is some kind of
excellence.  Occasionally, this is known
as an outstanding Fund I or II or even VI (or even maybe a single headline
exit).  Once in a while, arete mutates into its sinister cousin: hubris. 
Things get really dicey when the excessive pride of this second step
leads to ate, an unruliness marked by
a loss of sense of human limitations and reckless behavior that offends the
gods.  Now the gods tolerate a lot of
horseplay, but mortals should act like mortals and those that get really out of
hand provoke nemesis, the vengeful
justice of Olympus.

The genius of the tragedies arose from the fact that the
behavior was so outrageous and the punishment so ghastly that the stories
offered powerful warnings of what might happen if folks got too far out of
line.  Of course, I never root against
anyone, but I do sometimes wonder if we’re not getting off too easy
nowadays.  Nemesis used to be pretty badass: offend the gods and you get your
liver pecked out by eagles.  Every
day.  Forever. 

Today, the PE Tragic Heroes who have incurred the wrath of
the gods (or their bankers) are simply consigned to slow their pace of
investment, toggle their PIKs, and maybe get an askance mention in the Wall
Street Enquirer Journal.  If
the fates are particularly unkind, the Journal’s ink dot hedcut of the
Fallen Hero transforms from cheerful and affable to frowning and consternated, a la Dick Grasso.  Not quite the kind of
metamorphosis that Ovid would write about, but I guess that’s the best we can
hope for in a modern world where all the options seem free (but someone else is
paying the price.)

Beware of PE Managers Speaking Greek

So here’s a game I’m playing a lot lately: dueling
Greek.  No, I’m not finally fulfilling my
father’s long-dead wish that I attend Greek School.  It’s just that a lot of PE managers are
slinging the Greek around.  Seven or
eight years ago it was really rare for an LBO pro or VC to describe themselves
as an “alpha” manager, but it seems commonplace today.

Of course, I understand what people are getting at.  They’re suggesting that they’re after
improved risk-adjusted return.  But
that’s where it gets dicey: how do you articulate risk in a PE context?  And what’s the appropriate level of return
per unit of risk?

When I’m feeling saucy, I ask these self-proclaimed alpha managers: “ok, then,
what’s your beta?”  At that point, the
GP probably thinks that he’s got a smart aleck on his hands, but the question
is sincere.  Really, it is!  (I’m not one of those Dollar and a Dream
guys.)

As we all remember, alpha is the excess return of a
portfolio relative to the return predicted by a portfolio of similar risk
(expressed as beta).  Said more elegantly (note the gratuitous equation inserted to gain
credibility with the quants):

Portfolio alpha = Portfolio Return – (Risk Free Rate + Portfolio Beta * Equity Risk Premium)

So assuming a long-horizon nominal equity risk premium around
6.5% and an average nominal risk free rate of about 4.5%, a portfolio with a
beta of one should have a return of about 11% and anything above that is alpha,
sweet alpha.  [We could quibble about
time-varying premia and risk free rates, but the generic point is valid,
no?]  Here’s the catch: I just don’t
believe that PE betas are anywhere close to one; on the buyout side, higher
levels of debt implicitly raise beta while the venture guys have incredible
volatility of outcomes.

Fortunately, most folks decide to play along with the spirit
of the question and we typically get into good discussions of risk appetite,
tolerance, and management.  It’s always a
stimulating chat, but people rarely answer my question directly.  To be a sport, a GP once argued – with a grin
– that the beta had to be less than 1 because most people thought the
correlation of PE to the public markets was about 0.65.  Without skipping a beat, he acknowledged that
appraisal effects and stale prices made that number totally meaningless.

So, what is the beta of PE? 
Is it 1.25 (kinda like Vanguard’s small-cap Explorer fund)?  Or more like 2.0?  If it’s the former, you’ve got to generate
net returns greater than about 13% to have positive alpha; if it’s the latter,
your bogey is closer to 18%. 
[Interestingly, the time-worn PE goal of 500 bps of excess return
probably implies a beta of about 1.75, which is
about the beta exhibited by some public managers with concentrated portfolios].

At this point – like Chevy Chase
playing Gerald Ford – I exclaim, “I was told there would be no math here,” so
why sling numbers around in search of a pedantic point?  Because PE supposed to be a return enhancer
relative to public market alternatives (the opportunity cost of risk
capital).  I’m finding that when people
say “alpha,” they typically just mean “top quartile,” and that’s not alpha at
all.  Maybe “top quartile” will equal
positive alpha over time – I have my doubts – but right now it’s just a worn
marketing slogan.  Don’t get me wrong, I
love firms who can outperform their peer group, but unless we can figure out
how to find the folks who are generating true risk-adjusted excess
return, we need to keep asking ourselves the question: why bother? 

Justify My Love

My buddy Peter – a very smart cat – was a pure math major in
college. Once, I asked him what the
difference between pure and applied math was and he told me with an impish
grin: “the applied math guys know how to add . . .” Of course, Peter went to Brown University, a
very funky place, so I’m sure that he could’ve done an interpretive dance about
the Lebesgue Outer Measure and still gotten a passing grade on his senior
thesis (just kidding . . . feel the love, Providence!)

I, on the other hand, studied history in college which means
that I’m good with trivia at cocktail parties, but that’s about it. Every now and again, though, I get to
thinking about arithmetic; specifically, the arithmetic of the venture business
and I wonder if we’re all closer to the pure math end of the spectrum than the
applied end.

VC math should be pretty straightforward: send a dollar out
to a portfolio company and hope it comes back with a few of its friends. Do that often enough and you’ve got a good
fund-level return.

Unfortunately, the LPs who invest a Dollar and a Dream have
prevented the shakeout that we were all talking about in 2002 from happening
and there continue to be too many iffy $500 million “early stage” funds out
there. Now I’ve got nothing against $500
million funds in particular. Despite my
seed-stage and smaller-fund bias (I like being "long idiosyncrasy and short
momentum"), we’ve got a few investments in that size stratum and think those specific
guys have some distinctive advantages.

Here’s where it gets dicey for the masses, though (and I’ll
make some gross simplifying assumptions): if you’re an LP and investing in an
run-of-the-mill $500 million fund hoping to get a 3x net return, that fund has
to generate $1.75 billion in returns ($1.25B in profit less 20% carry equals two
turns of profit). Of course, that’s just
the capital that accrues to the firm’s ownership stake. Since a lot of firms end up owning only
10-15% of their companies at exit, you’ve typically got to gross the $1.75
billion up by a factor of between 6.67 and 10. That suggests that those firms need
to create between $12 and $17 billion of market
cap just to get a 3x
fund-level net return to their LPs. Caliente!

Let’s unpack that box a bit more: at the $15 billion midpoint of the exit range
above, a firm that invests in 25 early-stage companies will have to get, on
average, $600 million exit valuations for each and every one of them. That’s a pretty daunting number when you
consider that the typical M&A valuation has hovered in the high
double-digit millions for quite some time.

Of course, such a batting average would be unprecedented
(this is a slugging percentage business, after all), so if you assume that a
quarter of the companies generate all the returns while the other three
quarters collectively return the cost basis, each of those 6 home run companies has to enjoy an exit valuation
of $1.67 billion (roughly what Google paid for YouTube). That’s livin’ la vida loca!

The situation above is exacerbated by the fact that not all
firms invest 100% of their capital because they reserve up to 15% of capital for
fees. Also, you could make the argument
that the firms most likely to earn the above returns will charge premium
carries, making the hurdle higher for compelling net returns. To be fair, firms have a few levers to pull –
maintaining higher ownership percentages
(!) in companies and recycling capital – that can make the challenge less
daunting. They could also deploy less
capital per company, but that’s tough to do with a larger fund.

Like I said, though, I do still believe that some firms will
be the exceptions that prove the rule; some will be good while some others will
be lucky.

In the meanwhile, a lot of LPs will be serenading their GPs
with the line from that old Madonna song (cue the sensuous and moody bass line):
“I’m just wanting, needing, waiting for you to justify my love. Hoping, praying for you to justify my love .
. .”